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CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF THE MONTANA
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM: A PRPOSED REVISION
Laurence R. Waldoch*
INTRODUCTION
Article XI, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution provides that:
The general control and supervision of the state university and the
various other state educational institutions shall be vested in a
state board of education, whose powers and duties shall be pre-
scribed and regulated by law. .... 1
This article will analyze the meaning and effect of this provision,
review various decisions from other states with respect to control of
state universities, and present a proposed alternative for the considera-
tion of the framers of the new constitution.
Because of the wide variations in state constitutions with respect to
control of public universities, the persuasiveness of decisions from other
states is limited with regard to specific cases under a particular state
constitutional clause.2 For purposes of attempting to define what the
role of the governing board 3 should be, however, such cases are very
helpful. Despite differences in state constitutions, the essential question
is the same in every state-what is the proper balance of authority be-
tween the board of regents and the state legislature with respect to the
state university systeml
The material below is based on the premise that a state university
is fundamentally different from other state agencies in terms of its need
for some degree of autonomous control. This point was made in the fol-
lowing terms by one college president:
Highways can be changed (although it is an expensive proposition)
if mistakes are made; it is even possible to restock lakes and woods
if conservation programs lack effective and continuing leadership
and support, but it is virtually impossible to re-educate a generation
or several generations of citizens who have been deprived of their
rights through an educational system that is cramped or given im-
balance by a state government that does not recognize the necessity
of giving freedom to colleges and universities.4
While the necessity of allowing the regents, in cooperation with the
faculty and others in the academic community, to make final decisions
in the area of academic policy is generally recognized by legislators and
*Member of the Montana and Minnesota bars; Administrative Assist-
ant to the President of Montana State University, 1969-71; Associate
in the firm of Lindquist & Vennum, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1MONT. CONST. art. XI, §11.
'For a review of the role of the governing board in all fifty states, see CHAMBERS,
HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE FIFTY STATES (1970).
sHereinafter, the term "board of regents" will be used to refer to the governing
board of the state university system. In Montana the constitution refers only to
"state board of education," although the board is now commonly referred to as
''state board of education, ex officio regents of the Montana university system."
'Moos and IOURKE, THE CAMPUS AND THE STATE, 315 (1960).
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other state officials, the relationship between academic policy and other
external controls which may be imposed is often not understood.
Moos and Rourke explained this relationship as follows:
Where the onset of state control-administrative as well as political
-threatens to strip away the authority of independent governing
boards, it contains a grave threat to the intellectual as well as the
institutional independence of a university. These two phases of uni-
versity freedom cannot be disassociated. Intellectual freedom orig-
inally sprouted in an environment of institutional autonomy. It may
well lose its vitality altogether if public colleges and universities are
ever brought within the harness of conventional state administration.
Preserving the authority of lay boards of trustees from state inter-
ference is as vital to the freedom of a university as the defense of
freedom of teaching and research on the campus.5
Another writer has stated that "an independent ... university is as
essential to the community as an independent judiciary." This article
will review the failure of the present Montana Constitution to provide
sufficient authority to the regents and will propose a revision which
would provide such authority.
DECISIONS FAVORING AUTONOMOUS CONTROL
The decisions discussed in this section are from states which have
constitutional provisions regarding their respective universities that
are different from either the present Montana Constitution or the pro-
posal presented herein. These cases illustrate, however, that the neces-
sary independence of the regents can be maintained without undue
restriction of the powers and duties of the legislature and other de-
partments of state government.
In an 1896 case,7 the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the back-
ground of the decisions by the framers of the state constitution to
place the control and management of the university under a permanent
board of regents. It made the following comment with respect to a
report of an 1840 legislative committee:
No more forcible argument could well be made than is found in
that report for placing the entire control of the university in the
hands of a permanent board, and taking it away from the legis-
lature .... I quote from that report as follows: 'No state institution
in America has prospered as well as independent colleges, with
equal, and often with less, means. Why they have not may be as-
cribed, in part, to the following causes: They have not been guided
by that oneness of purpose and singleness of aim (essential to
their prosperity) that others have whose trustees are a permanent
body, -men chosen for their supposed fitness for that very office,
and who, having become acquainted with their duties, can and are
disposed to pursue a steady course, which inspires confidence and
insures success, to the extent of their limited means. State institu-
tions, on the contrary, have fallen into the hands of the several
legislatures, fluctuating bodies of men, chosen with reference to
their supposed qualifications for other duties than cherishing literary
WId. at 289-90.
6CHAYFE, Tim BLESSINGS or LmETY, 241 (1960).7Sterling v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 110 Mich. 369, 68 N.W. 253 (1896).
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institutions. When legislatures have legislated directly for colleges,
their measures have been as fluctuating as the changing material of
which the legislatures were composed. . ..
The court stressed the need for a permanent board of trustees with a
slowly changing membership to govern the university. It described
the results of frequent changes in the governing board in the following
terms:
At first they dig up the seed a few times, to see that it is going
to come up; and, after it appears above the surface, they must pull
it up to see that the roots are sound; and they pull it up again, to
see if there is sufficient root to support so vigorous branches; then
lop off the branches, for fear they will exhaust the root, and then
pull it up again, so see why it looks so sickly and pining, and finally
to see if they can discover what made it die. And, as these several
operations are performed by successive hands, no one can be charged
with the guilt of destroying the valuable tree.'
The improvement in the condition of the university, which
occurred subsequent to the transfer of control of the university to the
board of regents from the legislature in the constitutional convention
of 1850, was discussed by the court. It pointed out that the regents
assumed a strong role under the constitution and "for 46 years have
declined obedience to any and every act of the legislature which they,
upon mature reflection and consideration, have deemed against the
best interest of the institution. '" 10 The court further pointed out that
it had sustained the regents on every occasion on such matters.
The basis upon which the constitutional authority to govern the
university was granted to the regents was also considered by the court.
The opinion stated that:
Obviously, it was not the intention of the framers of the constitution
to take away from the people the goverjnent of this institution. On
the contrary, they designed to, and did, provide for its management
and control by a body of eight men elected by the people at large.
They recognized the necessity that it should be in charge of men
elected for long terms, and whose sole official duty it should be to
look after its interest, and who should have the opportunity to in-
vestigate its needs, and carefully deliberate and determine what
things would best promote its usefulness for the benefit of the
people...
The constitutions of several states have established the governing
boards of their respective state universities or land-grant colleges as
constitutional corporations.1" The nature of such a constitutional cor-
poration was described by the Michigan Supreme Court in Board of
Regents v. Auditor-General as follows:
sld. at 755.
9ID.
IId. at 256.
"Id.
'2CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS, 63 (1952). Chambers lists Michigan,
Minnesota, California, Idaho, Colorado, Oklahoma (land-grant institutions) and Utah as
having state universities with the status of constitutional corporations. Depending upon
the standard applied, this list may be altered to some extent by the erosion in recent
years in the authority of the regents in some of these states.
[Vol. 33
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[it] is made the highest form of juristic person known to the law,
a constitutional corporation of independent authority, which, within
the scope of its functions, is co-ordinate with and equal to that of
the Legislature.'
The question of whether a state university is granted status as a con-
stitutional corporation has been somewhat overemphasized in the past.
The fact that a university has corporation status does not guarantee
its constitutional authority will be protected from infringement by other
branches of state government. 1 4 Similarly, the fact that a university
is without corporate status does not mean that the control placed in
the board of regents may be usurped by other agencies at will.15 The
primary question is whether the essential control of the university is to
be placed in a board of regents and whether, in a particular case,
that control is improperly infringed upon by the legislative or admini-
strative branches of state government.
The power to control expenditures of university funds is of crucial
importance to the regents if they are to direct the university generally.
It is important to avoid confusing this problem with the appropriation
of funds to the university by the legislature. While the expenditure
of funds is a matter over which the regents should be given full
authority, the determination of the amount of money which should
be appropriated to the university is, of course, a matter within the
province of the legislature.
The type of problem which typically arises in this area is illu-
strated by State ex rel. University of Minnesota v. Chase, State Auditor,
in which the regents of the University of Minnesota brought an action
against the state auditor to require him to approve voucher and
issue his warrant in payment of an item of expense incurred by the
regents with respect to a preliminary survey for the purpose of install-
ing a plan of group insurance for members of the faculty and other
permanent employees of the university. 16 The court outlined the issues
as follows:
On the surface of things, the contest is between the board of regents
and the commission of administration and finance, hereinafter
mentioned only as the commission. But the real issue is between the
regents and the governor, made for them by chapter 426, G. L. 1925,
'An act in relation to the organization of the state government.' The
purpose of the law is to centralize administrative responsibility in
the Governor. . . . The commission, with entire candor, 'claims
authority to supervise and control the expenditure of any and all
moneys' by or for the University; 'the making of all contracts' by
the several officers, departments and agencies of the state govern-
ment, including the University and the board of regents; and that
the latter cannot lawfully expend any money, from whatever source
derived, for University support and administration 'for any purpose
or object which has been disapproved' by the commission or incur
"167 Mich. 444, 132 N.W. 1037 (1911).
"See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
"See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
"175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951 (1928).
1971]
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financial obligation for such purpose or object. The right so to con-
trol University finances is the power to dictate academic policy and
direct every institutional activity.1' (Emphasis added)
The recognition of the effect of financial control on academic
policy and other university activities is an essential step in the process
of balancing the authority of the regents with that of the legislature
and other state officers. The court stated that its decision did not mean
that the regents were "an independent province or beyond the law-
making power of the legislature," but that since the constitution had
vested the "whole executive power of the university" in the regents,
no part of that authority could be exercised or put elsewhere by the
legislature. 18 It therefore held that the auditor had no authority to
refuse to issue the warrant and that he could not be given a veto power
over university expenditures.1 9
In the Sterling case the court declared invalid an act which would
have forced the regents of the University of Michigan to establish a
medical college in the city of Detroit and discontinue the existing medi-
cal college in Ann Arbor. After pointing out that the constitution pro-
vided that the regents "shall have the direction and control of all ex-
penditures from the university interest fund," the court stated:
The power th.erein conferred would be without force or effect if the
legislature could control these expenditures by dictating what de-
partments of learning the regents shall establish, and in what places
they shall be located. Neither does it need any argument to show
that the power contended for would take away from the regents
the control and direction of the expenditures from the. fund. The
power to control these expenditures cannot be exercised directly or
indirectly by the legislature. It is vested in the board of regents in
absolute and unqualified terms.'
The line between the authority of the regents to control expendi-
tures of funds and the authority of the legislature to appropriate such
funds is particularly difficult to draw in cases involving appropriations
to which specific conditions have been attached by the legislature. The
right of the legislature to impose such conditions on appropriations
was described in the following terms by the Idaho Supreme Court:
When an appropriation of public funds is made to the University,
the Legislature may impose such conditions and limitations as in
its wisdom it may deem proper. If accepted by the regents, it is
coupled with the conditions, and can be expended only for the pur-
poses and at the time and in the manner prescribed, and can be
withdrawn from the state treasury only as provided by law."
"Id. at 952.
1Id. at 954. The court stated that ''generally the distinction between the jurisdiction
of the Legislature and that of the Regents is that between legislative and executive
power. " I
"Id. at 955. See also, State Board of Agriculture v. Fuller, Auditor General, 180
Mich. 349, 147 N.W. 529 (1914).
'Sterling v. Regents, supra note 7 at 257. See contra, State ex rel. Bushee v. Whitmore,
85 Neb. 566, 123 N.W. 1051 (1909).
'State ex rel. Black v. State Board of Education, 33 Idaho 415, 196 P. 201 (1921).
[Vol. 33
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Such conditions may not be of such a nature as to constitute an
infringement upon the constitutional authority of the regents, however.
After referring to a previous case22 in which the court had upheld the
authority of the legislature to attach "any conditions it may deem
expedient and wise . . . " the court interpreted the decision as follows:
Clearly, in saying that the Legislature can attach to an appropriation
any condition which it may deem expedient and wise, the court had
in mind only such a condition as the Legislature had power to make.
It did not mean that a condition could be imposed that would be an
invasion of the constitutional rights and powers of the governing
board of the college. It did not mean to say that in order to avail
itself of the money appropriated the state board of agriculture must
turn over to the Legislature management and control of the college,
or of any of its activities.'
The court conceded that it is not an easy matter to separate control
of the expenditure of money for a certain activity from control of the
activity itself, but held that activities which were controlled by the
board of agriculture under the constitution could not be subjected to
the supervision of the state administrative board.
2 4
Most problems in this area can be avoided by a refusal on the part
of the courts to allow the legislature to impose conditions which in
effect transfer control over expenditures from the regents to state
administrative departments. While certain restrictions imposed directly
by the legislature-such as limits on salary increases, travel restrictions
and other similar matters-may to some extent infringe upon the author-
ity of the regents, the greater infringement is likely to occur where
authority is transferred to other administrative bodies.
DECISIONS NARROWLY CONSTRUING REGENT AUTHORITY
Ultimately, the maintenance of a state university system with a
sufficient degree of self-determination and autonomy depends less upon
the wording of the state constitution than upon such factors as the
degree of support given to educational institutions within the state,
the degree to which the role and authority of the regents is understood
by the regents themselves and university administrators, and the degree
to which the legal concepts involving the role of the regents are under-
stood by the supreme court of the state. The failure of a strongly-
worded constitution to protect the university from adverse decisions by
the state supreme court is illustrated by the case of University of Utah
v. Board of Examiners.25 The action was brought by the regents of the
University of Utah against the board of examiners of the state, the
commissioner of finance, the attorney general, the state auditor and
the state treasurer, alleging that the defendents were improperly assert-
22Weinberg v. Regents, 97 Mich. 246, 56 N.W. 605 (1893).
EState Board of Agriculture v. State Administrative Board, 226 Mich. 417, 197 N.W.
160 (1924).
'4The case involved the question of whether the state administrative board could con-
trol expenditures for agricultural extension work.
14 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348 (1956).
1971]
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ing the legal right to exercise control over the management of the
university in derogation of the authority granted to the regents by
Article X, Section 4, of the Utah Constitution. Article X, Section 4
provided that all rights previously granted to the university and the
agricultural college were perpetuated.26  The key language of Chapter
IX, Laws of Utah 1892, approved February 17, 1892, which established
the rights which were perpetuated by the constitution was quoted by
the court as follows:
Sec. 1 . .. It [the University of Utah] shall be deemed a public
corporation and be subject to the laws of Utah, from time to time
enacted, relating to its purposes and government, and its property,
credits and effects shall be exempt from all taxes and assessments.
. . . Sec. 3 The government of the University and the management
of its property and affairs is vested in a board of nine regents, .... '
On the basis of this language, the lower court declared unconsti-
tutional certain statutes which treated the university as other state
institutions, including statutes requiring preaudit of bills, submission of
work programs and deposits of university funds into the state treasury.28
After pointing out that it was not called upon to decide whether
an autonomous university is better than a legislatively-controlled uni-
versity, the court analyzed at length the distinctions between the con-
stitutions of the states of Minnesota, Idaho, Michigan and other states
as opposed to the constitution of Utah. The court pointed out that most
of the language from such states as Minnesota, Michigan and Idaho
was identical to that of the Utah constitution, but that the phrase that
the university would ". . . be subject to the laws of Utah, from time to
time enacted, relating to its purposes and government" meant that the
University of Utah was not a constitutional corporation beyond legis-
lative control. The court held that under Utah law the constitution
is in no manner a grant of power, it operates solely as a limita-
tion on the legislature, and an act of that body is legal when the
constitution contains no prohibition against it. .
..
The court pointed out that for over fifty years the university had
never raised the issue of independent control, but during that period
had accepted the doctrine that it was "subject to the laws of the
state." It pointed out that in certain past cases, the university had
adopted a position which specifically recognized legislature control.30
The practical reason for the failure of the regents to assert their author-
ity was described by the court as follows:
In those early days the Regents were not disposed to tell the Legis-
lature to leave them alone. They weren't taking any chance on
offending Santa Clause."
211d. at 349.
2Id. at 352.
2Id. at 350.
"Id. at 361.
sold. at 363.811d. at 366.
[Vol. 33
7
Waldoch: Constitutional Control of the Montana University System
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1972
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL
The court further reasoned that:
It must be conceded that had its Regents in those early years
asserted its independence from the Legislature, it is doubtful thatit would have attained a stature which would induce it to declare
its independence.'
There can be no question that the court was correct in its deter-
mination that the constitution of Utah was distinguishable from those
of other states having universities with rights of constitutional cor-
porations. In its 23-page opinion, however, the court failed to devote
a single word to the central issue before it-whether the acts in ques-
tion were contrary to the clear statement that "the government of the
university and the management of its property and affairs is vested in a
board of nine regents. . . ." The court failed to consider, for example,
whether the fact that not a penny could be spent by the regents without
the permission of the board of examiners left the regents with any
authority other than that which the board of examiners may choose
to voluntarily grant.
The court made no attempt to determine whether the regents could
be "subject to the laws of Utah" while still managing the property
and affairs of the university. It failed to consider whether these two
seemingly contradictory phrases could be interpreted in such a manner
that both phrases would survive. Rather, it reached a decision which
left the regents with absolutely no power except that which the legis-
lature may wish to grant. Article X, Section 4 of the constitution of
Utah was essentially "read out" of the constitution by the court.
The manner in which the university initiated the law suit could
be partially responsible for the result reached by the court. The lower
court holding in the form of a declaratory judgment that the univer-
sity was a constitutional corporation free from the control of the
legislature, administrative bodies, commissions and agencies and officers
of the state,3 3 is clearly impossible to defend in view of the provision
that the university shall be subject to the laws of Utah. A broad,
declaratory judgment defining the nature of the regent's authority is
both unnecessary and unwise. The regents should simply have refused
to comply with a particular legislative act which they considered to
be an infringement upon their authority. They could then have argued
that while they were admittedly subject to the laws of Utah, the par-
ticular law involved violated the clause which vested in the regents
the management of the affairs of the university.
In reviewing the results which it felt would follow if it declared
the acts in question unconstitutional, the court argued that the uni-
Old. at 368. It is impossible to determine whether this speculation played a substantial
role in the court's decision. It is submitted however, that the court is wrong with
respect to such speculation, as evidenced by such universities as those of Michigan
and Minnesota, neither of which have been "punished" for their independence.
mId. at 349.
1971]
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versity and the regents would have ".... a blank check enabling them to
expend all funds without any semblance of supervision or control.
'8 4
The court stated that:
To hold that respondent has free and uncontrolled custody and use
of its property and funds, while making the State guarantee said
funds against loss or diversion is inconceivable.'
Again, the court failed to consider whether there is some middle
ground between "free and uncontrolled custody and use of its property
and funds" and the situation approved by the court in which the uni-
versity was left without power to spend any funds without the approval
of the board of examiners. Several states have upheld the constitutional
authority of their regents to control state universities without consider-
ing such regents to be uncontrolled and beyond all restraint of the
legislature5 6
MONTANA DECISIONS
Since the basic aim of this article is to present an analysis of how
the relationship between a state board of regents and other state de-
partments should be established by the state constitution, no attempt
will be made to fully review the current state of the law in Montana
with respect to the authority of the regents. The material below is
presented to indicate that the Montana Supreme Court has given little
effect to Article XI, Section 11 of the constitution which vests the
general control and supervision of the state university in the board
of education. While the court has in some cases protected the university
from infringement upon statutory authority granted by the legislature,
there have been no cases in which the court has relied upon the con-
stitutional clause to limit the legislature in its direction of university
affairs.
The authority of the regents to hold and disburse university funds
was upheld by the court in State ex rel. Koch v. Wright, State Treasurer.3 7
The action was brought by the treasurer of the state agricultural col-
lege to force the state treasurer to turn over to him proceeds from the
sale of bonds issued by the state board of land commissioners pursuant
to certain statutes. Section 1636 of the political code of 1895 was quoted
as follows:
Immediately upon the receipt of the money, the proceeds of the sale
of said bonds, the state treasurer shall turn the same over to the
treasurer of the agricultural college, and it shall be disbursed by
him on orders of the executive board of the said agricultural
college .. . provided, however, that the general supervision of the
"Id. at 370
85Id. The court also pointed out that the holding sought by the regents would allow
them to authorize out-of-state travel for university employees without previous ap-
proval by the board of examiners. No consideration was given to the question of
whether this type of decision was an "affair of the university," the control of which
was given to the regents by the constitution.
soNote, 55 MicH. L. REv. 728 (1957).
817 Mont. 77, 42 P. 103 (1895).
[Vol. 33
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construction and erection of such building or buildings, and the
furnishing and equipping thereof, shall be under the control of
the state board of education.'
In a one paragraph opinion, the court held that the state treasurer
was bound to turn over to the treasurer of the state agricultural col-
lege the proceeds of the sale of bonds issued immediately upon receipt
of the money and that the proper disbursement of such fund was a
matter with which the state treasurer had no concern. While the
decision makes no mention of the constitutional provision relating to
the authority of the regents, it does indicate that in the period shortly
after the constitutional convention of 1889, both the legislature and the
court gave effect to the broad grant of authority provided to the
regents by the constitution.
The authority to control university funds was again approved in
1901 in State ex rel. Koch v. Barrett, State Treasurer.39  The court
held that the land-grant funds provided by the federal government
were to be disbursed through the executive board of the agricultural
college and the state board of education and were not subject to Article
VII, Section 20 of the constitution which provides that claims against
the state other than for the salary of a public officer should be audited
and allowed by the state board of examiners and paid only on the
warrant of the state auditor. As in the earlier 1895 case, the court
again relied upon statutory authority which had been granted to the
board of education in reaching its decision. The court described the
powers and duties of the board of education as "very extensive" and
quoted from Section 1516 of the political code as follows:
The powers and duties of said board shall be as follows:
(1) They shall have the general control and supervision of the
state university and the various state educational institutions. (2)
To adopt rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the constitution
and laws of this state, for its own government and proper and neces-
sary for the execution of the powers and duties conferred upon
them by law. (3) To prescribe rules and regulations for the govern-
ment of the various state educational institutions. . . . (10) To
receive from the state board of land commissioners or other boards
or persons, or from the government of the United States, any and
all funds, incomes and other property to which any of the said insti-
tutions may be entitled, and to use and appropriate the same for the
specific purpose of the grant or donation, and none other and to
have general control of all receipts and disbursements of any of
said institutions.'
The court quoted with approval the following language from an
earlier case involving the university bond fund:
It is evident furthermore that the act of the legislature providing
for the erection of the university building did not contemplate that
claims arising under the terms of the contract for the buildings
should be subject to approval by the state board of examiners.'
88Id.
1925 Mont. 62, 66 P. 504 (1901).
'Old. at 506.
"Id. at 507. The court was quoting its earlier decision in State v. Collins, 21 Mont.
448, 53 P. 1114 (1898).
19711
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Although it is submitted that the court should not be unduly in-
fluenced by legislative enactments in defining the scope of authority
of the regents under Article XI, Section 11 of the constitution, it is
evident from the above two cases that early legislators considered the
authority of the board of education to be very broad.
The reliance by the court, as well as the regents themselves, upon
legislative grants of authority eventually led to the conclusion that
the legislature was in no way restricted in defining or limiting the
scope of authority of the board. In State v. Brannon4 2 the Montana
Supreme Court upheld an act requiring the chairman of the department
of chemistry of the state College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts
to analyze and test samples of gasoline submitted to him by the public
service commission without compensation. The court rejected the argu-
ment that the statute infringed upon the constitutional authority of
the regents to control and supervise the university. It stated that:
The board of education is a part of the executive department, and
is but an agency of the state government. The Legislature may pre-
scribe the extent of the powers and duties to be exercised by the
board in the general control and supervision of the University of
Montana. The Legislature may broaden the functions of the Uni-
versity, or any of its units. It may require research and experi-
mental work to a greater extent than is now being carried on, and
for the public benefit may require the discharge of functions in
new fields. In other words, the state may extend, and add power to,
its developmental arm."
The argument that the board of education is "within the scope of
its functions, coordinate and equal with the legislature" was also re-
jected by the court.44 The court merely pointed to Article I, Section 4,
of the state constitution, which provides that the powers of govern-
ment of the state are divided into the legislative, executive and judicial
branches.
While the court can hardly be criticized for rejecting the over-
generalized argument that the board is "equal with the legislature"
within the scope of its functions, it failed to consider whether the
constitutional authority of the board to control and supervise the
state university had been infringed upon by the legislature. After
quoting Article XI, Section 11, the court stated as follows:
Observe the care employed in the construction of this sentence. The
general control and supervision of the State University and the
various other educational institutions are vested in the state board
of education whose powers and duties shall be prescribed and regu-
lated by law. A law may be enacted by the people exercising
the initiative or by the people acting through the Legislature.
In either case the power to enact a law is illimitable, except as re-
strained by the Constitution. (Cases cited) (Emphasis by the court)'
'p86 Mont. 200, 283 P. 202 (1929).
"3Id. at 208.
"Id.
,AId.
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This analysis by the court can be criticized on two grounds: First,
the court failed to consider whether the legislature was prescribing
powers and duties of the board, or "controlling and supervising the
university." It may be argued that the legislature's power to prescribe
duties of the board does not include the power to carry out those
duties by assigning particular tasks to a professor. Secondly, the court
failed to recognize that excessive emphasis on the authority of the
legislature to prescribe powers and duties of the board may have the
effect of eliminating the entire clause from the constitution. It is clear
that if this clause were not present in the constitution, the legislature
would have authority to create a state university and create a board to
administer it. The difference would be that the legislature would be
completely unrestrained in prescribing or even eliminating the authority
which it had granted to such a board.
The nature and extent of the authority of the board of education
was further discussed by the Montana Supreme Court in the 1963 case
of Brown v. State Board of Education.4 6 The case involved the question
of whether the board could delegate authority to the president of one of
the university units to hire instructors and whether the board had in
fact made such an authorization. Plaintiff alleged that she had a con-
tract of employment for the summer session of 1962 and was entitled
to $1300 for the two month period. The contract had been approved by
the college administrators but had not been formally approved by the
board of regents. The plaintiff asserted that an express statute author-
ized the board to delegate to the president and faculty the selection of
teachers and other employees. The court quoted R.C.M. 1947, Section
75-107 as follows:
Powers and duties, The state board of education shall have power
and it shall be its duty: ...
12. To choose and appoint a president and faculty for each of the
various state institutions named herein, and to fix their compen-
sation....
14. To confer upon the executive board of each of said institutions
such authority relative to the immediate control and management,
other than financial, and the selection of the faculty, teachers, and
employees, as may be deemed expedient, and may confer upon the
president and faculty such authority relative to the immediate
control, and management, other than financial, and the selection
of teachers and employees, as may by said board be deemed for the
best interest of said institutions. ' (Emphasis supplied by court)
A careful reading of the emphasized portion of Section 75-107
makes it difficult to accept the position taken by the board and the
court. It is equally plausible to read the phrase, "other than financial"
as a modification of the terms "management" and "control," and con-
clude that the board may grant to the president and faculty "authority
relative to . . . the selection of teachers and employees."
"142 Mont. 547, 385 P.2d 643 (1963).
'71d. at 646.
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The court concluded as a separate matter that no delegation of
power by the board was attempted and that no implied power to con-
tract was shown. 48  The case could have been decided simply on the
basis of this conclusion without any discussion of whether the board
could delegate such authority. Thus, the court's discussion of statutory
limitations on the authority of the board may be regarded as dicta.
The essential point in Brown with respect to the basic authority
of the regents, however, is not whether the court and the board were
correct in their interpretation of the statute but whether the statute
should have been given any effect if it was in fact a limitation on
the authority of the regents to select academic personnel. The question
of whether the authority to control academic personnel policies is in-
cluded in "the general control and supervision of the state university
. . ." under Article XI, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution was not
discussed by the court nor raised by any of the parties.
The position taken by the board in this case was clearly harmful
to its own interest. The entire matter in controversy could have been
cleared up administratively for future cases, and the board could have
simply conceded in this particular case. To argue before the supreme
court that this question was controlled by statute indicates a failure by
the board and its legal counsel to understand the nature of the con-
stitutional grant of authority.49
The primary question concerning the present language of Article
XI, Section 11, is whether the authority of the legislature to prescribe
and regulate powers and duties of the board is in any way limited by
the phrase, ". . . the general control and supervision of the state uni-
versity and the various other state educational institutions shall be
vested in a state board of education. . . ." As indicated by the Brannon
and Brown decisions, the supreme court appears to take the position
that the legislature may prescribe and regulate duties and powers of
the board of education without limitation. The failure of the court to
make any attempt to balance these two phrases should be given serious
consideration by the framers of the new Montana Constitution.
1Id. at 647.
"The board of education was represented by the Attorney General in this case. The
question of whether the attorney general 's membership on the board makes him the
legal counsel for the board has never been clarified. While the board and various
attorney generals have apparently assumed that the Attorney General is necessarily
the attorney for the board, this writer strongly disagrees with such an assumption.
The authority of the board to hire independent, nonpolitical legal counsel is crucial
and should be exercised by the board. See also, People v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321, 46
N.E.2d 951 (1943), where it was held that the University of Illinois board of regents
was not an agency of the state but a separate corporate entity which functions as
a public corporation and was therefore entitled to employ its own counsel and that
such functions were not the duty of the attorney general.
[Vol. 33
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INTERPRETATION OF
"PRESCRIBED AND REGULATED BY LAW"
Other courts have approached this type of question in a more analy-
tical way and reached decisions which give effect to both the grant of
authority to the regents and the limitation of that authority. The
Idaho Supreme Court was faced with this question in a 1921 case in-
volving the issue of whether the regents could spend university funds
held by the state treasurer without first submitting all claims to the
state board of examiners for approval. 50 The court pointed out that
the state constitution vested in the regents "the general supervision of
the University, and the control and direction of all of the funds of,
and appropriations to, the University, under such regulations as may be
prescribed by law."51 (Emphasis by the court) The court acknowledged
that the emphasized phrase distinguished Idaho's constitution from
those of such states as Michigan and Minnesota, but it concluded that
the board was a constitutional corporation with independent authority,
and made the following statement:
The regulations which may be prescribed by law, and which must
be observed by the regents in their supervision of the University,
and the control and direction of its funds, refer to methods and
rules for the conduct of its business and accounting to authorized
officers. Such regulations must not be of a character to interfere
essentially with the constitutional discretion of the board, under
the authority granted by the Constitution. (Emphasis added)"
Thus in limiting the regulations which may be prescribed by law to
those which did not essentially interfere with the constitutional author-
ity granted to the regents by the constitution, the court preserved both
the grant of authority and the limitation on that authority.
A similar approach was taken by the supreme court of Nevada in
King v. Board of Regents of the University of Nevada, where the court
declared unconstitutional an act creating an advisory board of regents
of Nevada State University.53 The court quoted Article XI, Section 4
of the Nevada constitution as follows:
The legislature shall provide for the establishment of a state uni-
versity, which shall embrace departments for agriculture, mechanic
arts and mining, to be controlled by a board of regents, whose duties
shall be prescribed by law."
The court further pointed out that the constitution provided that at
the expiration of the term of office of the original board of regents
"... the legislature shall . . . provide for the election of a new board of
regents, and define their duties. '55
"State ex rel. Black v. State Board of Education, 33 Idaho 415, 196 P. 201 (1921).
5Id. at 204.
62Id.
"65 Nev. 533, 200 P.2d 221 (1948).
1Id. at 222.
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The opinion stated that it is well settled that the legislature is
without power to abolish a constitutional office "or to change, alter
or modify its constitutional powers and functions."5 6 The court reasoned
that:
The immediate problem before us is to determine whether the act
in question does or does not 'change, alter, or modify (the) con-
stitutional powers and functions' of the board of regents created
by the constitution. If it does so, then under the well settled rule
. . . we must hold the act invalid.'
On this basis the court held that the creation of an "advisory"
board of regents with many of the same rights and privileges as the
board itself was unconstitutional as an infringement upon the authority
of the regents. It gave no effect to a savings clause in the act which
provided that "no provision of this act shall be construed to be in
derogation of the constitutional authority of the elected board of regents
to administer the affairs of the university. .... -58
The case of Serling v. Regents of the University of Michigan59 in which
the Michigan Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a statute which
would have forced the University of Michigan to relocate its medical
school was cited with approval. The court recognized that the phrase
"under such regulations as may be provided by law" was not present
in the Michigan constitution, but stated that:
If we are correct in concluding that the defining of duties is one
thing, and that the creating of a new board with equal rights and
privileges (with the exception noted) is an entirely different thing,
then the Michigan case (with whose philosophy we are in entire
accord) becomes authority of the highest rank.'
The court analyzed the case of University of Minnesota v. Chase in a
similar manner:
We note again frankly that there was lacking in the Minnesota
constitutional provision the reservation to the legislature of the
right to fix the duties of the regents, but as above noted, encroach-
ment on constitutional functions cannot be justified in the guise
of defining duties, so that the lack of the Nevada clause in theMinnesota constitution does not weaken the authority of the Minne-
sota case.'
Thus, in the King case, as in Black, the court interpreted the phrase
"under such regulations as may be prescribed by law" in a manner
such that it did not weaken the basic grant of authority to the regents
to control the state university.2
1Id. at 223.
56Id. at 227.
571d.
5Id. at 222.
Sterling v. Regents, supra note 7 at 233.
6MKing v. Board, supra note 53 at 231.
'State ex rel. University of Minnesota v. Chase, supra note 16 at 951.
MKing v. Board, supra note 53 at 233. See also, Dreps v. Regents of the University
of Idaho, 65 Idaho 88, 139 P.2d 467 (1943).
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As these two decisions indicate, the extent of authority of a board
of regents must be defined with respect to the particular dispute at hand
rather than in terms of broad generalities. Each judicial decision should
involve a balancing of the authority of the regents to control the uni-
versity with that of the legislature to enact laws which may limit such
control.
NATURE OF REGENT AUTHORITY - PROPOSED CRITERIA
The failure of many boards of regents to understand the nature
of their authority as well as the limitations on that authority has
contributed to a similar lack of understanding by the courts. Rather
than relying on unrealistic theories of complete immunity from legis-
lative acts, those who wish to protect regent authority should attempt
to define that authority on the basis of whether the specific statute in
question will substantially interfere with the overall direction and
management of the university. An understanding of the manner in
which courts have treated such questions in the past is essential for
the proper drafting of a new constitution. The cases discussed below
will provide some additional indication of the types of considerations
which have been used to determine whether particular types of author-
ity fall within the province of the regents or within that of the legis-
lature.
With respect to the authority to control personnel policies, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that the University of Idaho and its regents
were not subject to a nepotism act passed by the state legislature. The
court stated:
the legislature possesses no power to place any restrictions on
the Board of Regents in the matter of their employment of pro-
fessors, officers, agents or employees; nor can they tell the Board
whom they may and may not appoint.'
Similarly in a 1949 case the Supreme Court of Arizona refused to
allow legislative encroachment on the authority of the regents to control
policies regarding nonacademic employees as well.6 In a unanimous opin-
ion the court stated that:
To permit legislation to throw the employment and supervision of
all personnel under the civil service law, except the teaching staff,
would necessarily deprive the board of regents of a large portion of
its constitutional supervisory power. We have no hesitation in
holding that such legislation runs counter to article 11, section 2,
Arizona constitution.'
It should be pointed out that Article XI, Section 2 of the Arizona Con-
stitution to which the court referred is not particularly a "stronger"
section than Article XI, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution. It states
that:
6Dreps v. Regents, supra note 62.
"Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242, 204 P.2d 854 (1949).
65Id. at 860.
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The general conduct and supervision of the public school system
shall be vested in a state board of education, a state superintendent
of public instruction, county school superintendents, and such govern-
ing boards for the state institutions as may be provided by law.'
In a later case the court made it clear that this decision was not
intended to place the regents beyond the authority of the legislature.
7
By upholding a legislative act providing for review of university ex-
penditures by the state auditor, the court made it clear that it intended
to consider the degree to which the particular act complained of in-
fringed upon the authority of the regents, rather than to attempt to
decide in general terms whether the regents are or are not subject to
the control of the legislature.
It is obvious that however autonomous a university may be, it
has no authority to take actions which are prohibited by the state or
federal constitutions. This was pointed out in dicta in State ex rel.
Sholes v. University of Minnesota,6 8 where plaintiff brought a mandamus
action against the university and the regents to compel the adoption
of rules and regulations prohibiting the use of university property for
the teaching of religious doctrine or in any aid of religion except for
purely secular use essential to teaching. The court stated that:
It goes without saying that the board of regents has no discretionary
power to do or permit any activity which is in contravention of the
powers conferred upon it by its charter, nor may it evade the con-
stitutional proscription of forbidden activities under the guise of the
exercise of its discretionary powers or of its legislative function.. ..
The court found no evidence, however, that the university had attempted
to engage in activities which violated the constitution. It therefore
held that the remedy of mandamus was not available to plaintiff.
Several Michigan cases indicate that an autonomous university is
not necessarily free from all laws and policies of the state. In holding
that the board of regents of the University of Michigan was subject
to a statute declaring that the defense of governmental immunity to
tort actions no longer existed, the court stated that "in spite of its
independence, the Board of Regents remains a part of the government
of the state of Michigan. '70 Since the doctrine of soverign immunity
had been overturned by both the supreme court and the legislature of
the state, the court held that the doctrine no longer existed in Michigan
with respect to the university or any branch of state government. The
court stated that:
It is the opinion of this Court that the legislature can validly exer-
cise its police power for the welfare of the people of this state, and
a constitutional corporation such as the Board of Regents of the
University of Michigan can lawfully be affected thereby. The Uni-
"ARiz. CONsT. art 11, § 2.
07Board of Regents v. Frohmiller, 69 Ariz. 50, 208 P.2d 833 (1949).
8236 Minn. 452, 54 N.W.2d 122 (1952).
OId. at 129.
"Branum v. State of Michigan and Board of Regents, 5 Mich.App. 134, 145 N.W.2d
860 (1966).
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versity of Michigan is an independent branch of the government
of the state of Michigan, but it is not an island. Within the con-
fines of the operation and the allocation of funds of the University,
it is supreme. Without these confines, however, there is no reason
to allow the Regents to use their independence to thwart the
clearly established public policy of the people of Michigan.'
The Supreme Court of Michigan has also upheld statutes benefitting
public employees which affect the University of Michigan. With respect
to an act giving employees the right to join labor organizations and
to engage in certain activities for collective bargaining purposes, the
court stated as follows:
All of the foregoing are rights given to the plaintiff's employees
and in none of these activities, either by the employees, or in the
administration of the act conducted by the defendent board, do we
find any interference with the general supervision of the university.
Therefore, those rights and privileges which are granted to the
employees by the provisions of [the statute] do not interfere with
the constitutional grant of general supervision to the [regents]."
In reaching this decision the court relied partially upon the case of
Peters v. Michigan State College in which the state supreme court in
a four to four decision affirmed a lower court holding that Michigan
State was not immune from the workmen's compensation act.73
In the cases discussed above, the court avoided the all-or-nothing
approach taken by the Montana court in the Brannon case and the Utah
court in the Board of Examiners case. The criteria listed below may
be helpful in avoiding such an approach and may be helpful to the
draftsmen of the new Montana Constitution. Among the factors which
should cause courts to generally uphold statutes affecting regents are
the following:
1. Matters which are "legal theories". This would involve such legal
doctrines as sovereign immunity. The independence of the university
is in no way threatened by the application of such a doctrine to the uni-
versity. The reasons underlying the possible elimination of sovereign
immunity are as applicable to the university as to any other department
of the state. Of course the university is obviously subject to the law
of the state as it has developed in areas such as torts and contracts.
2. Matters of general social policy. In cases dealing with such matters
as anti-discrimination laws, minimum wage laws, workmen's compen-
sation and other similar matters, the university should be considered
subject to such laws even though a direct expenditure of funds by the
university may be necessary under them. The grant of authority to
the regents should not mean that the university system can be operated
under static social policy for the indefinite future.
nId. at 862.
2Regents of the University of Michigan v. Labor Mediation Board, 18 Mich. App.
485, 171 N.W.2d 481 (1969).
"320 Mich. 243, 30 N.W.2d 854 (1948).
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3. Employee rights. This type of issue is similar to the social policy type
of statutes. Examples would again include minimum wage laws, collec-
tive bargaining laws, laws involving working conditions and other
similar matters. Other examples might include "right to privacy"
statutes which would limit the power of the regents to require certain
types of information from students or employees.
4. Certain matters affecting physical operations. Matters such as fire
safety regulations and safety requirements on machinery should be
binding with respect to university operations. These laws clearly do
not involve any attempt to interfere with the essential operations of the
university. Similarily, the university should be bound by air pollution
standards and other anti-pollution laws.
Matters which should generally cause a court to consider a statute
to be in violation of the authority of the regents to govern the
university:
1. Transfer of control to other state agencies. This is the single most im-
portant area in which the authority of the regents can be rapidly
diminished. A common example is the type of statute which gives another
state agency authority to give prior review to expenditures of univer-
sity funds. Many other examples of such laws may be cited, including
control of purchasing, control of building and building design, control
of automobiles, control of accounting procedures and other similar mat-
ters. The essential problem with all of these transfers of control is that
the degree of control exercised by the agencies involved tends to in-
crease without the knowledge of the legislature. Once such control is
lost to other agencies, it is often impossible for the university to regain it.
2. Powers which can lead indirectly to other forms of control. This
problem is present in all of the examples presented in the above para-
graph. For example, the authority of a state controller or board of ex-
aminers to control university expenditures may in practice lead to the
exercise of control by such an officer or board over many other matters
entirely unrelated to his authority. No argument is needed to show
that an officer who controls expenditures of university funds could
easily exert improper influence on such matters as hiring and firing of
professors and other university officials. Of course, this can quickly
lead to the filling of university administrative positions with policital
appointees.
3. Statutes referring only to the university. Courts should take a par-
ticularly careful look at statutes which might have been applied gen-
erally, but in fact were applied only to the university. This type of
problem was present in loyalty oath and anti-communist statutes. Prob-
lems in this area are diminishing because many of these statutes have
been declared invalid on other grounds.
4. Statutes which are specific acts of management. Examples of this
might be a legislative act requiring the expansion of a particular branch
[Vol. 33
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of the agricultural experiment station or a statute requiring the ex-
pansion or elimination of a program at a particular unit of the system.
It is also arguable that the legislature should not make appropriations
to particular units, but rather should make one appropriation to the
regents to be divided as the regents consider appropriate. This
would avoid the problem of expanding certain units of the system for
the reason that their local legislators are particularly strong within the
legislature. Of course, there is no guarantee that the board of regents
itself would be entirely free from this sort of bias, but the matter
would at least be removed from the political arena.
5. Academic matters. If the board of regents has any constitutional
authority at all, it certainly has authority to control the academic pol-
icies of the university. The concept that academic policy should be based
on political considerations and political pressures to which the legisla-
ture is subject, is incompatible with the democratic tradition. Courts
should refuse to allow the legislature to make any incursions into this
area, however slight they may be.74
PROPOSAL FOR THE NEW MONTANA CONSTITUTION
As the material above indicates, it is the view of this writer that
the present clause in the Montana Constitution as interpreted by the
Montana Supreme Court provides the board of regents with inadequate
protection from infringement upon its authority by the legislature. It
is submitted that an attempt should be made to draft a clause which
would provide such protection subject to reasonable limitations. Such
a clause would be drafted in such a manner as to encourage the court
to apply the criteria discussed above to cases involving the authority
of the regents.
The following clause is suggested as an appropriate way to grant
such reasonable authority to the board of regents while subjecting the
board to reasonable limitations.
Section 1: The government and control of the academic, financial
and administrative affairs of the Montana university system shall
be vested in a board of regents, who shall be selected as provided
herein. The regents shall have the power, and it shall be their duty,
to govern the university system as a public trust, in a manner con-
sistent with the general laws of Montana. The legislature shall pass
no law which infringes upon, diminishes or transfers to another
body any of the authority provided by this section.
Section 2: The board of regents shall consist of eight members
who shall hold office for terms of eight years and who shall be
elected by the legislature sitting in joint session. The present
appointive members shall hold office until the expiration of their
present terms. Two terms shall expire on July 1 of each odd-num-
bered year, with election of their successors taking place during the
legislative session of that year.
"
4An example of such an act is REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 75-8902 (1947), passed
by the legislature in 1971, which requires all units of the Montana University System
and all private colleges in the state to offer a .course on alcohol and drug abuse.
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The implementation of this section in the new Montana constitution
would strengthen the role of the regents without a radical departure
from the present situation. The basic aim of the proposal is to keep
the control of the university system a safe distance from the political
arena, while at the same time keeping the board of regents in suffici-
ently close contact with the legislature to provide some degree of re-
sponsiveness to the views held by the legislature. It is submitted that
this proposal would create a balance between the one extreme of control
by an aloof, unresponsive board of regents and the other extreme of
control directly by the legislature.
The task of determining whether particular legislative acts "in-
fringe upon, diminish or transfer to another body" any of the constitu-
tional authority would remain with the supreme court. While it is the
view of this writer that the present version of Article XI, Section 11,
would-if properly interpreted-produce results similar to those which
should be expected from the proposed revision, the proposal provides
substantially more guidelines upon which the court could base its de-
cisions. While no particular phrases in the constitution can provide a
guarantee against an erosion of the authority of the regents, the basic
power of the regents to govern the university system would be clearly
stated.
The limitation that the university system shall be governed "in
a manner consistent with the general laws of Montana" would make it
clear that, while the legislature may not interfere with regent control
of the university system, the regents would not have authority to dis-
regard legislative enactments which cannot be said to infringe upon,
diminish or transfer regent authority. The university system would
thus be subject to such statutes as those involving minimum wages,
workman's compensation, fair employment, safety standards, anti-pollu-
tion statutes and other such laws which can be complied with without
sacrificing the principle of regent control. Similarly, it would be clear
under the proposal that the regents would be subject to legal doctrines
developed by the supreme court in such areas as sovereign immunity.
It might be noted that the proposal could be modified if the fram-
ers of the new constitution so decide, by deleting the sentence "the
legislature shall pass no law which infringes upon, diminishes or trans-
fers to another body any of the authority provided by this section." It
might be argued that this sentence is unnecessary in view of the
language preceeding it which grants control of the university system
to the regents. The sentence is included to avoid the possibility of an
over-emphasis by the supreme court of the phrase "in a manner con-
sistent with the general laws of Montana" in such a way as to diminish
the grant of authority to the regents.
It is often argued that legislative power to control the purse strings
of the university in effect gives the legislature complete control over
[Vol. 33
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the policies of the university. Examples of interference by individual
legislators into internal university affairs are no doubt common, 75 but
such interference can often be minimized by a recognition on the part
of university officials and regents that constitutional authority to govern
the university is not a commodity which can be "sold" for a temporary
increase in appropriations.
Although the informal influence of legislators is subject to abuse,
it can be very beneficial in terms of keeping regents and university
administrators aware that legislators have a legitimate interest in uni-
versity affairs and that legislators must be informed with regard to
university affairs to properly determine the appropriate level of funds
which should be appropriated to the university. This type of influence
is entirely different from direct interference by statute in an internal
university affair.
The quality of higher education in Montana will continue to depend
more upon the caliber of the state's legislators, regents, and general
citizenry than upon the phrasing of this constitutional provision. It is
submitted, however, that the adoption of the proposed constitutional
provision will provide the necessary framework within which the uni-
versity system can be improved and creatively adapted to continually
changing needs.
75See, Enrollment Limitations on the Oregon State System of Higher Education,
1969-70: Fact or Fiction, 49 ORE. L. REv. 322 (1970). The author suggests that
limitations on enrollment of out-of-state students resulted from pressure from key
legislators who threatened to reduce appropriations for the university if such en-
rollment restrictions were not imposed.
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